In Justice for Hedgehogs (JH), Ronald Dworkin has written a truly remarkable philosophical work. It advances a bold treatment of all the. Baedeker — Independence. Truth in morals — External skepticism — Morals and causes — Internal skepticism — Interpretation. Moral responsibility — Interpretation . One of the greatest legal and moral philosophers of the postwar era, Ronald Dworkin argues in his new book, Justice for Hedgehogs, that there.

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Hanif Mumtaz rated it liked it Jun 01, Justice for Hedgehogs has similar how-many-angels-can-dance on-a-pinheadpassages, but it’s grander in vision. A just distribution of resources requires some form of a free market, capitalist economy: We must be mindful of Dworkin’s point that living well does not require the sorts of achievements and ‘success’ implied by ‘a good life’. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 Find it on Scholar.


But what distribution of which resources is implied by his interpretation of equality? Basically, ethical truths hedgeuogs viewed as analogously to discovering “things” “out there” in the way a scientist studies bodies or a theologian studies God. In his most comprehensive work, Ronald Dworkin argues that value in all its forms is one big thing: Dworkin defends a ‘full value holism’ and a principle of ‘the unity of value’.

Such interpretations are value-laden because they require value judgments concerning the content which we ought to give to both principles of dignity. This condition of self-respect already suggests how living well may require moral virtues and duties, insofar as they enter into a person’s self-image.

The Galilean revolution once made the theological world of value safe for science. The Road Not Taken: Internal skeptics draw on some moral convictions to undermine our belief in the truth or falsity of others, whereas external skeptics seek to stand outside every framework of moral convictions in order to raise doubts about all of them.


God, argues Dworkin, gave us moral laws whose truth was guaranteed by Him. The further thought that our values and their implications are best identified and reconciled on the basis of an underlying ideal of human dignity should provoke considerable discussion.

Wandering about the house, benignly ensuring that all the themes are getting on together, drawing guests in and making them feel at home is the man himself, sometime philosopher, sometime journalist, sometime popular essayist, sometime political pugilist — but mainly man of ideas whose disciplined mind has transcended the arid demands of any department.

He understands political rights as protections of interests of persons that are so weighty that they trump other social goals, such as economic growth. It’s a wiser Dworkin, who’s learned how to use footnotes. Feb 23, A.

The title is a riff on the saying made famous by Isaiah Berlin that “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thin In this extraordinarily ambitious book, Dworkin attempts nothing less than a thorough re-grounding of political philosophy, ethics and epistemology. The heart and soul of Dworkin’s work is the argument for the unity of value which defends an original account of ethics, morality, and politics.

Not an easy read, but immensely rewarding. What he says by way of answer makes me feel I need to up my game. Which Concepts Should We Use?: Such rights are rooted in equal concern and respect for all, ideas which are in turn founded on a respect for universal dignity. The book takes a strong stance against scientism and its particular reductivism.

Rights are one thing, human rights another. Each person must take his own life seriously: It is made, not found, through the practice of interpretation. It offers a challenge to the reader at whatever stage of his or her life to rethink projects hedgegogs priorities. Living well depends on whether the things one desires are worthy of desire and possess an objective value, apart from the preferences and pleasure embodied in them.


This interpretation of human dignity as the ground of both ethical and moral value — living well and respecting duties hesgehogs others — provides Dworkin’s desired unity, integrity of fit, between these two values.

The digital Loeb Classical Library loebclassics. Mar 23, William Schram rated it it was amazing Shelves: Rawls’ conception of primary social goods is a prominent hedvehogs of this approach.

Justice for Hedgehogs // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

His glittering intellectual career. Dworkin advances the interpretive hypothesis that truth is whatever convictions constitute the best solution to dworkih problems central to a domain of inquiry. Thus, recognizable moral virtues are required by living well, but these virtues or their opposite — moral vices — are important bases of appraisal-respect.

Dec 30, Robin Friedman rated it it was amazing. The problem is how to identify these interests and political rights.

Dworkin’s principle of the unity of value advances an account of values e. Respect for personal responsibility identifies and grounds 1 some measure of self-government — political rights that empower individuals to participate in the collective decisions through which their lives are governed ‘positive liberty’ ; and 2 some measure of freedom from collective decisions concerning aspects of persons’ lives over which they alone should be making decisions for themselves ‘negative liberty’.

Jan 30, Angela Randall marked it as to-read Shelves: The auction ends when each has used up her tokens as effectively as possible and no one would trade her package of resources for anyone else’s.