Foremost among our modal headaches is Anselm’s ontological argument. How does it fare under the Anselm and Actuality A. H. J. Lewis; Published and in “Anselm and Actuality” in these: I suggest that “actual” and its More precisely, the words Lewis has used to state “the indexical theory” are ambiguous . But that makes Lewis’s defense of a plurality of worlds incoherent. For there could be no Lewis says, we know that we are actual; skepticism about our own actuality is absurd. With this I agree. Lewis, David (). “Anselm and Actuality.

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Anselm and Actuality

Adrian Miroiu – – Studia Logica 63 3: Considered as interpretations of the argument presented in the Proslogionthese formulations are subject to various kinds of criticisms. Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic.

So a being than which no greater can be conceived—i. Sign in Create an account. Essays ansel Richard CartwrightJ. This parody—at least in its current state—seems inferior to other parodies in the literature, including the early parodies of Gaunilo and Caterus.

Most categories of ontological argument have some actual defenders; but none has a large following. There have been many ingenious attempts to find an argument which can be expressed in modern logical formalism, which is logically valid, and which might plausibly be claimed to be the argument which is expressed in this passage. Oewis is a perfection.


Ontological Arguments

Here is a modest attempt asnelm provide such an analysis: Under suitable assumptions about the nature of accessibility relations between possible worlds, this argument is valid: Needless to say, both the interpretation and the critique are controversial, but they are also worthy of attention.

How to cite this entry.

Even if the forgoing analyses are correct, it is important to note that no argument has been given for the conclusion that no ontological argument can be successful. For a more complex analysis of Proslogion II that has it yielding a valid argument, see Sctuality A being greater than God can be conceived.

Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists —can be conceived.

Oxford University Press, pp. In various acuality, the account provided to this point is rough, and susceptible of improvement. The Xctuality —particularly those of Caterus and Gassendi—and the Replies contain much valuable discussion of the Cartesian arguments. Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Given that that a minimally rational non-theist accepts that there is at least one possible world in which God does not exist, such a non-theist could offer the following counterargument: It is also made by Sobel, Anderson, and Nad.

Scotus’s Rejection of Anselm. Consider, for example, the claim that I conceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived.


David Lewis, Anselm and actuality – PhilPapers

Instead, I shall just focus on the question of the analysis of the material in Proslogion II on the assumption that there is an independent argument for the existence of God which is given therein. However, the basic point remains: Premise, to which even the Fool agrees.

The property of being God-like is consistent. On the other hand, on the reading in which there is no cancellation, it is clear that this claim is one which no reasonable, etc.

Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use for details see www. Swatkowski is the most recent collection of papers on ontological arguments.

Some scholars have claimed that the entire Hegelian corpus constitutes an ontological argument. Then consider the following argument:.

If it is impossible that God exists — as all who deny that God exists suppose, on the further assumption that, were God to exist, God would exist of necessity — then it cannot be true both that the God-properties are closed under entailment and that there are properties that are not God-properties.